-what do time-consistent banking policies look like during a panic?
-are such policies consistent with a self-fulfilling run by depositors?
-how does a lack of commitment by policy makers:
-affect the possibility of self-fulfilling bank runs?
-shape the course of a crisis?
• We show:
-self-fulfilling runs can occur (with no restrictions on contracts)
-these runs involve interesting "policy dynamics": waves of withdrawals, each followed by a new policy response -endowment: 1 at t = 0, nothing later -utility:
-type θ i is revealed at t = 1; private information -ex-ante probability π of being impatient -(known) fraction π of depositors will be impatient -8/33-
-simple, because there is no aggregate uncertainty γ > 1 implies c * 1 > 1 (potential for illiquidity at t = 1)
c * 2 > c * 1 → partial insurance
• Depositors have an incentive to pool their endowments for insurance purposes -9/33-Banking • Banking technology → allows depositors to pool resources and invest at t = 0 and receive payments at t = 1, 2
• Sequential service constraint (formally): Depositors ...
-are isolated from each other (as in Wallace, 1988)
-can visit "the bank" only one at a time -must be paid as they arrive (first-come, first-served)
-order of withdrawal opportunity is given by index i -depositors know this order (as in Green and Lin, 2000)
• Each depositor visits the bank in either t = 1 or t = 2 -10/33-• Operation of bank is characterized by a payment schedule:
x : [0, 1] → R + μ th depositor to arrive at t = 1 receives x(μ)
-depositors withdrawing at t = 2 divide matured assets evenly
• Note: some of the payments may not be made x is a complete contingent plan; the banking policy
• Feasibility
Strategies and payoffs
• Each depositor chooses a withdrawal strategy y i :
• Aggregate welfare:
• Given a banking policy x -depositors play a non-cooperative, simultaneous-move game 
Definitions of equilibrium
• An equilibrium with commitment is a pair (x * , y * (x)) such that:
for all x and s; and (2) x * = arg max
⇒ the banking authority recognizes the influence of x on the equilibrium play in the depositors' game
• An equilibrium without commitment is a pair (x * , y * ) such that:
(1) y * (s) ∈ b Y (x * ) for all s; and (2) x * = arg max -threat never needs to be carried out in equilibrium
• Without commitment, response to a run must be ex post optimal -some depositors still in line are (truly) impatient -temptation to make additional payments at t = 1 -but ... additional payments threaten solvency -18/33- -Total deposits fell 4.3% ($3.1 billion)
• Suspension of payments declared on December 1, but...
-depositors could withdraw up to 1000 pesos/month/account -could also petition courts citing "special needs"
• Over next 6 months: 25% of remaining deposits withdrawn Point:
• Suspending payments may be difficult/undesirable ex post -20/33-Equilibrium without commitment
• The first-best allocation is still an equilibrium outcome
• patient depositors receive c * 2 > c * 1 at t = 2 ⇒ lack of commitment does not affect the "no run" equilibrium -if more than π withdrawals, a run is underway ⇒ divide remaining resources evenly (reschedule payments)
• But the a patient depositor with i > π receives
-waiting is better ⇒ this is not an equilibrium -24/33-• There cannot be an equilibrium in which all depositors run in some state -eventually the banking authority will find out -reacts in a way that removes the incentive to run -different from "run-proof contracts" in existing literature -note the interplay between withdrawal decisions and policy responses
• An equilibrium bank run must be partial, with only some depositors participating -25/33-
• One possibility:
For s > α : y n = θ i for all i For s ≤ α :
• Then banking authority's best response is:
-26/33-• The partial-run strategy profile is an equilibrium if
Prop. 1: A partial run equilibrium exists (under some conditions)
• A "wave" of withdrawals, then policy response halts the run • Banking authority is initially "optimistic"
-probability of run is not too large
• Bank remains optimistic through π withdrawals
• After π withdrawals, discovers a run is underway -responds by adjusting payments -at that point run halts, but ...
-all remaining depositors receive less than c 1 -28/33-
Waves of withdrawals and policy responses
• Other, richer equilibria exist under same conditions
• After π withdrawals, run continues with some (small) probability -banking authority is optimistic run has stopped ⇒ sets b c 1 relatively high; banking system is illiquid (again)
⇒ opens the door to the possibility that the run continues
• After π + π (1 − π) withdrawals, discovers whether run has stopped -if not, reduces early payment further
• Could repeat any number of times -29/33-Prop. 2: Given any λ < 1, there exists an equilibrium where t = 1 withdrawals exceed λ with positive probability.
• The value of λ determines the number of waves
• Interesting "dynamics":
-crisis develops gradually, in waves -each wave of withdrawals provokes a policy reaction -after each reaction, run may end or may deepen -the bank never completely fails at t = 1; some payments made at t = 2
• Small crises are more frequent than large crises -30/33-• Note: the banking authority is always "optimistic"
-initially believes a run is unlikely -at each decision point, is optimistic that the run has ended
• Reminiscent of the summer 2008
-Mishkin in July 2008: "The period of extreme stress seems to have abated, and financial markets are showing some tentative signs of revival."
• This is an inherent feature of equilibrium -policy maker correctly anticipates the probability that conditions will worsen; responds appropriately.
-when (and only when) this probability is small enough, the response leaves the door open for the crisis to deepen -31/33-
Conclusion
• Removing the assumption of commitment from the canonical banking model shows:
-self-fulfilling bank runs can occur -these runs involve waves of withdrawals and policy responses -interplay between depositors' decisions and policy makers' responses shapes the course of the crisis • Main insight: lack of commitment combined with (rational) optimism may be at the root of the "bank run" problem -32/33-Open questions:
• Are government guarantees (incl. deposit insurance) a good solution to the problem?
• What are the effects of bailout policies on incentives and behavior?
• How important are dynamic considerations (i.e., reputation)?
Future work: Institutions and "credibility" in banking policy -33/33-
